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THE SCOTTISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
James G Kellas 
What is the significance of the Scottish Constitutional Convention? Has it 
changed Scottish politics in any way, and will it hasten the establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament? 
The Convention, which met in public on seven occasions from 30 March 
1989 to 30 November 1990, has had a mixed reception from Scottish 
politicians, academics and journalists, and only lukewarm support from the 
Scottish public. As is well known, the Conservatives refused to participate, 
and the SNP withdrew after the initial planning meeting on 27 January 1989. 
The Greens 'suspended' their participation during the final week of 
deliberations in November 1990(1 l. 
The final Report of the Convention<2l is a short (20-page) brochure which 
is directed essentially at the general public rather than at legislators or an 
academic audience. Nevertheless, it can be analysed in academic terms, as will 
be attempted here. It is clearly intended to form the basis of legislation, but if 
the Scotland Act 1978 is any guide, such legislation would be considerably 
more detailed than the Report. Indeed, that is particularly vague on many 
matters, such as the electoral system for a Scottish Parliament, the method of 
revenue-raising, and the "entrenching" of the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament. The electoral system proposal rejects the 'first-past-the-post' 
system and seeks one "in which the number of seats for various parties is 
broadly related to the number of votes cast for them", but it does not specify 
which system that might be. The revenue-raising proposals are unclear on how 
the Scottish contribution to the UK Exchequer is to be measured. 
"Entrenchment" of Scottish powers seems to rest ultimately not on any law or 
Constitution but on making it "practically and politically impossible" for 
Westminster to overrule or abolish the Scottish Parliament when it sees fit. 
The Report is silent on the 'West Lothian Question' (the voting rights of 
Scottish MPs at Westminster in English matters), the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, and the number of Scottish MPs. There are of course political as well 
as constitutional reasons why these topics are skirted round or ignored. They 
are the favourite attacking-points used by anti-devolutionists, and some of 
these topics such as the number of Scottish MPs impinge on the strength of the 
Labour Party, since most of these are presently Labour. 
A summary of the Convention's Report in terms of academic analysis 
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would place the scheme somewhere between devolution and federalism. The 
Claim of Right for Scotland which prefaces the Report asserts the "sovereign 
right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited 
to their needs", and asserts "the right of the Scottish people to secure the 
implementation of that scheme". This is federal ra~her than devolu~i?nary 
language, because it emphasises the bottom-up (Sco~ttsh) aspects oflegit~mate 
power, rather than its top-down location (Westmmster-_based). Consistent 
with federalism too is the talk of "entrenchment" of Scottish powers, and the 
representation of Scotland in international bodies such as the European 
Community. There are some quite advanced ingredients such as a Charter of 
Rights "which would encompass, and improve upon, the European 
Convention on Human Rights". This implies that within the United Kingdom 
civil rights in Scotland might be different from those in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This might be seen as giving Scotland even more 
independence than a unit in a federal state. 
More reminiscent of devolution, however, is the listing of powers which 
the Scottish Parliament could exercise ("a defined range of powers and 
responsibilities") while implicitly leaving Westminster with its old unlimited 
'sovereignty' intact. Westminster's primary powers over Scotland ~re how~ver 
stated to be confined to "defence, foreign affairs, central economic and fiscal 
responsibilities, and social security policy". While there is a shift in the balance 
here to Scotland as compared to the Scotland Act 1978, in constitutional terms 
the status of Scottish Government remains that of devolution from a sovereign 
Parliament rather than a federal (treaty) arrangement between equal partners, 
underpinned by a written Constitution of a federal nature. The financial 
provisions talk of a system of '"assigned revenues', ie revenues assigned to 
Scotland's Parliament as of right", but that "right" derives from a British Act 
of Parliament and a British Government's decision, not from a Constitution. 
Such rights can in theory be easily revoked by the central Parliament, ~nd the 
limitations on Scottish tax powers ("there should be some range defmed so 
that the variation in income tax up or down cannot be misunderstood as being 
by a wide margin") are more restrictive than those ~ormally associ~ted w!th 
federalism. All in all then, a hybrid between devolutiOn and federalism, With 
more practical features of the former than of the latter, ~ut with some fede_ral 
claims at a theoretical level (eg concerning the sovereignty of the Scottish 
people, and entrenched Scottish powers). However, it must be bo~ne in mind 
that in academic analysis and real politics federalism and devolutiOn are not 
always clearly distinguished (for example, Belgium and sgain are not federal 
countries, but have been partly 'federalised' in the 1980s) 3l. 
What of academic analysis of the Convention? An 'academic' analysis is 
one which seeks to avoid a partisan or ideological approach, and instead 
relates the subject to theoretical concepts and uses a comparative and 
historical method (looking across countries and across historical periods for 
guidance). But at the end of the day, even academics cannot avoid parading 
their prejudices, and I declare my sympathy with the primary aim of the 
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Convention, a Scottish Parliament. This does not mean that there is necessarily 
an 'academic' (scientific) case for such a body, though there mi~ht be. Some 
academics who wrote on the Convention, such as Roger Levy 4) and James 
Mitchell<'l were critical or even hostile. I was supportive<6l, and the well-
known political theorist Bernard Crick was positively ecstatic at the prospect 
of the Convention provoking fundamental constitutional reforms throughout 
the United Kingdom(7l. 
An academic study of the Convention would look at the degree of support 
which it was accorded generally. Here the media plays a crucial part in linking 
political elites with the mass public. Journalists tended to follow the 
proprietorial/editorial line of their papers, although some like Neal Ascherson 
in the Independent on Sunday were veteran devolutionists in the indifferent 
London environment. The Scotsman and Glasgow Herald were supportive, 
but the Sunday Times Scotland was opposed. Other papers in Scotland, 
especially the tabloids, paid little attention to the Convention. Broadcasting 
gave good coverage at first, but eventually made only brief reports in news and 
current affairs programmes. 
The public at large was divided fairly equally into those who had heard of 
the Convention and those who had not, but polls continued to show around 
three-quarters in favour of some form of Scottish Parliament (including 
independence). It was somewhat worrying for the Convention, however, that 
by May 1991, a poll<Xl showed independence to be a more popular option 
(supported by 37%) than devolution within the United Kingdom, the 
Convention's proposal (supported by 33% ). Moreover, if a Scottish Assembly 
were to lead to Scotland having higher taxes than England, respondents split 
equally (at 43%) for and against having such an Assembly. To that extent then, 
the Scottish people were divided on the conclusions of the Convention, 
although these might not necessarily imply higher taxes. 
In Scottish history Conventions come and go, and for some observers 
nothing much seems to change. There is still no Scottish Parliament, let alone 
Scottish independence, and not all that much hope for one either if the 
Conservatives remain in government. Even Labour cannot be trusted to 
deliver, according to some, and the Liberal Democrats are perennially 
powerless. Moreover, some of these critics see the Convention's proposals as 
fatally flawed anyway. No sensible person, according to them, would want the 
Convention's brand of devolution. This is the view of the Conservative 
establishment, the CBI and Chambers of Commerce, big business, and some 
Conservative Churchmen in the Church of Scotland (the General Assembly in 
May 1991 saw an unsuccessful attempt to divest the Kirk of its support for the 
Convention). 
Is there an 'objective' political science way to look at these questions, or 
must we always resort to partisan or sectional mud-slinging? In another article, 
I tried to examine the constitutional options for Scotland from the perspective 
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of political scienc~, th~t is to .say
9 
from a theoretical po!nt. of view, using 
comparative and histoncal studies< l. Here, I shall.take a similar al?proach to 
the Convention. I have indicated that other academics have strong views about 
the Convention and that therefore no academic consensus is likely to emerge 
on the subject, 'at least on the pros and cons of the Convention's pr~posals. 
However, perhaps the nature of the disagreements coul? be put mto an 
academic context, and the reader might then be able to consider what mode of 
interpretation is involved. 
Change and continuity in Scottish politics: the devolution ratchet 
While there have been 'Conventions' before in Scottish history (Mitchell 
discusses those in 1924, 1926, 1927, 1947, 1948, 1949), there has never b~en a 
Convention with such a wide membership, and with such an extended se~Ies of 
meetings. Moreover, quite an elaborate org~~isatio~ was set up, ~nderpmned 
by the Convention of Scottish Local Au~honties, whi~h also provided ~om~ of 
the funding. Thus history does not JUSt 'repeat Itself, and a histone~ I 
framework must take account of change as well as continuity (Levy sees this 
clearly, though he disapproves of the direction of the change). 
Most significant was the presence at the meetings of a large number of 
MPs local councillors and delegates of the Churches, STUC, and so for.th. 
Fro~ a purely political point of view, the participation or support of leadmg 
politicians in the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat.s gave ad?~d status. to 
the Convention proceedings. It also meant that the mam Opposition J?arhes 
were effectively committed to the Convention's Report, a~d they pro.mised to 
legislate on it if returned to powe~. No l?revious ConventiOn had this sort of 
support. It is true that these promises will have to be put to the test. But the 
ratchet of progress towards devolution has been turned at least one notch by 
the Convention. 
The boycott of the SNP and the Conservative P~rty clearly dented the 
devolution consensus, but it is not clear what effect this has ha~. What .these 
parties feared above all was being commi~ted to J?Oiicie~ they did not w.Ish to 
support by being outvoted on the ConventiOn. This applied also to .the Liberal 
Democrats and Greens, who nevertheless participated. While the fmal Report 
confirmed the worst fears of the non-participating parties (and at the end also 
of the participating Greens), the agreement. ~~tween Labour and the 
Democrats was significant in view of the possibility that a future. Labour 
Government might be dependent on Democrat votes in a_'h~ng Parliament'. 
So two future possible election results (overall Labou~ m~Jon~y, an~ Labour-
Democrat majority) were catered for by the ConventiOns deliberatiOns. The 
Leader of the Opposition, Neil Kinnock, declared that a ~abour Govern-
ment would legislate on devolution during its first year of office, and another 
Labour Shadow Government spokesman Roy Hattersley has backed the 
Convention scheme. No party leaders had ever before made such a 
commitment with regard to a Convention scheme. It may be argued that 
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Labour and the Democrats would have introduced devolution anyway, 
without the Convention. But as we shall see, the Convention changed the 
nature of the devolution proposals, and heightened its priority in the 
Opposition parties' programmes. 
The absence of the SNP and Conservatives probably makes no difference 
to the strength of the Convention's influence. The SNP has not increased its 
vote by non-participation, if anything the reverse. It is likely that when the 
next devolution Bill is introduced, the SNP will split as over the Scotland Act, 
but with the same tendency to settle for 'half a loaf rather than no bread'. The 
Conservatives may also split, for their devolutionists are now re-asserting 
themselves under John Major's benign regime. In any case, they would be out 
of power should the legislation be introduced. 
How the Convention changed the devolution proposals 
Until1989, when the Convention commenced, devolution proposals were 
to be found in the programmes of the Labour and Liberai!SDP Alliance 
parties. There were obvious differences between these programmes, notably 
in the federalist nature of the Liberal proposals, and in the more devolutionist 
approach of the Labour Party. By the time the Convention reported at the end 
of November 1990, the Labour proposals had merged with those of the 
Liberals. There was even a commitment to change the devolved electoral 
system in the direction of proportional representation, something the Labour 
Party had always resisted, and still resists for Westminster. A new system of 
'assigned revenues' was accepted eventually by the Convention. This was 
traditional Liberal policy, and was different from the Labour 'block grant' 
proposals of 1978, although an element of block grant remains in the form of 
an equalisation payment from the British Parliament, to be based on needs in 
Scotland. This would be negotiated with the Treasury. Academic assessments 
of fiscal federalism and devolutionary finance stress the multiplicity of 
arrangements in different systems, and the ultimate importance of political 
will rather than economic factors( 10l. 
These proposals show that the Convention has again turned the ratchet of 
devolution one or two notches higher where it mattered in the programme of 
a prospective British government (this is recognised by critics such as Levy and 
Mitchell, who nevertheless dismiss the Convention's proposals). The reason 
for this development is entirely due to the Convention process. The Labour 
Party needed to retain the cooperation of the Democrats if it was to be a 
Convention rather than the Labour Party Conference under another name. At 
the same time, the Democrats needed Labour if the Convention was to be a 
credible exercise in constitution-making. Curiously, the Democrats seem to 
have taken most of the initiatives and to have prevailed in argument on nearly 
every occasion. Similar inputs came from the women's movement 
(representatives in the Labour Party and STUC, and the Scottish Convention 
of Women) and the Greens. So the tail in effect wagged the dog. Political 
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scientists call this the 'minimum winning coalition', although here it is a moral 
coalition, since Labour already had a majority in the Convention. Of course, 
after a general election the minimum winning coalition in the House of 
Commons would consist of seats only, and might be Labour alone. Yet it will 
be difficult for Labour to shake off its Convention commitments, assuming 
that it would wish to do so, which it may not given the strength of Scottish 
Labour backbench pressure in the 1990s. 
The Convention's Proposals: Do they make political sense? 
The Convention's Report to the Scottish People was the result of eighteen 
months' negotiation between the delegates who comprised the Executive 
Committee (the plenum merely endorsed without vote). The result was 
obviously a political compromise between parties and organisations. Does that 
matter in politics? Most constitutions have been designed in this way, the 
classic case being the American Constitution, cobbled together over four 
months in the Philadelphia Convention in 1787. It still exists. Ratification in 
Britain will have to be in the UK Parliament, through an Act passed by a 
majority present and voting. No referendum is planned this time. In the US, 
ratification was to be by nine out of thirteen states. In the event, the US started 
with eleven states in 1789, and the two others joined soon after. 
If there is no Labour Government, then ratification of the Convention's 
proposals in legislation becomes virtually impossible (it seems unlikely that the 
Democrats would ally with the Conservatives to obtain devolution, but it is 
remotely possible). The Convention's fall-back strategy if it cannot get 
legislation through Westminster remains unclear. Appeals to the Scottish 
people through a referendum are on the cards, but this is no 'revolutionary' 
Convention, on the French or American models. As Mitchell notes, a 
unilateral declaration of devolution is a 'constitutional absurdity•(! I). But wait 
a minute. The Convention's Report is itself a unilateral declaration of 
devolution, and it has already captured the (British) Labour Party and its 
leaders. So British politics is responsive to unilateral declarations of this kind, 
even if the British Constitution is not. 
What of The Claim of Right for Scotland, with its declaration of the 
sovereignty of the Scottish people? Is this an absurdity too? To Levy it is 
dangerous nationalism, yet it has been subscribed to by the law-abiding 
signatories of the Convention (including Privy Counsellors Sir David Steel and 
John Smith, and the Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar). 
Political scientists (unlike philosophers) tend to take claims of sovereignty 
with a pinch of salt, and work out the implications from practice not theory. 
Thus the declarations of 'sovereignty' by the Ukraine and other Republics in 
the USSR, and by the 'sovereign states' in the US, do not necessarily mean the 
same thing, or indeed anything of a specific nature. What the Convention 
means by it has been well noted by the SNP. It does not mean independence for 
Scotland, because the Convention is wedded to devolution within the UK. 
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What it seems to mean is a quasi-federal assertion of 'independence within a 
sphere' on a coordinate (not subordinate) basis with the British Parliament. 
Does that make political sense? It probably does, at least as much as the Treaty 
of Union 1707 (with its two Established Churches, two legal systems, etc), and 
the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and its successors (the despised 
'unilateral devolution' rejected by the Conservatives for Scotland, but pressed 
by them on Northern Ireland). Britain and British politics seems to be capable 
of almost any twist in territorial constitutional arrangements. 
Yet there are many problems of a technical nature still to be addressed if 
Parliament comes to legislate on the Convention's proposals. The most 
tedious of these is the 'West Lothian Question' (can't we leave that one 
alone?), followed by the existence or not of the Scottish Secretary (who cares, 
except perhaps the potential office-holder?). More important (but not much 
more) is the question of the number of Scottish MPs in the House of 
Commons; quite important is the revenue-raising system for a Scottish 
Parliament; and crucial may be the nature ofthe electoral system (without PR, 
Scotland looks at the moment like a one-party state dominated by the central 
belt). This is particularly important for the Democrats, whose continued 
support is valued by the Labour leadership. 
Political scientists (when they are speaking as such and not as partisans) 
have no clear answers to any of these questions. They tend to let politicians or 
the people decide for themselves in each country, and then assess 'success' or 
'failure' in terms of stability, efficiency, responsiveness, and so on. In other 
words, all these 'problems' are essentially political rather than 'scientific' 
questions, matters of preference and will. The analysis of these is not easy, 
because things keep shifting, and both elite and mass inputs are involved. 
Reversals of party policies are notorious in devolution, and it might not be too 
surprising to find the Conservatives espousing federalism or even Scottish 
independence (there is already some evidence of this, with Conservative 
S~ottish Office minister Allan Stewart sayinB that he would give independence 
his second preference after the status quo)< ->. Malcolm Rifkind (Secretary of 
State for Scotland, 1986-1990) has always proclaimed his support for 
federalism (when the English are ready for it). 
It is possible to attempt political science theory here, using comparisons 
with other countries facing similar problems, and looking at how in history 
state structures have changed, especially in Europe. All the evidence points to 
devolution or federalism as a contemporary 'stage' in the development of the 
state, but in a bewildering variety of forms (try Spain for a start). So it looks as 
if devolution is coming to Scotland, and sooner rather than later, if it is 
accepted that decentralisation of power is a general feature of contemporary 
politics in Europe. 
Where does this leave the Convention's proposals? They are probably 
more 'advanced' than most devolution systems, for reasons which relate back 
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to the Convention's process of decision-making. The inclusion ofthe principle 
of equal representation of men and women can be related to the input of the 
women's movement, which is particularly strong in the Labour and Democrat 
parties. Then, the panoply of Iegalisms regarding 'entrenched powers', a Bill 
of Rights, and Scottish representation in the European Community seems to 
have come from the lawyers in the Liberal Democrat delegation. The 
Churchmen on the Executive (curiously important, though not mainstream 
parish ministers, rather Canon Kenyon Wright of Action of Churches 
Together in Scotland and Rev Norman Shanks - a Glasgow University 
lecturer) topped up the whole thing with morality, sentiment and historic 
memory. The eminence grise of the Claim of Right was reportedly 1 ames (Jim) 
Ross, the retired Scottish Office Under Secretary, formerly in charge of the ill-
fated Scotland Act, who knew well its deficiencies (he knew even better the 
deficiencies of Scottish government). His legacy carried over into the 
Convention's deliberations, though he does not appear to have been an active 
participant. He gave an unusually professional flavour, along with the Liberal 
Democrat lawyers, to an otherwise amateur exercise. Economists such as 
David Heald were important influences on the revenue side. All in all, an 
impressive array of the 'great and good' within the Liberal-Labour-nationalist 
establishment (not of course SNP Nationalists, except for I so bel Lindsay, who 
effectively left the SNP over the Convention), underpinned by the hard and 
practical men (and some women) of the Labour Party, local authorities 
(mainly the same people), the STUC, and so on. 
The final meeting of the Convention to present its Report to the Scottish 
People on 30 November 1990, included a 'Procession of Civic Heads of 
Scottish Local Authorities' in full regalia in the new Glasgow Royal (yes, 
Royal) Concert Hall, and 'A Celebration' by various singers, poets, writers, 
and musicians. All were in exuberant (if sometimes melancholic) form. It 
looked like a nation being reborn, but soon the doubts returned. Where was 
the popular will to force it through? What if Labour was not in power to do it? 
Political scientists, bruised by their failure to predict nationalist revolutions in 
Spain, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere, like 
everyone else, must 'wait and see'. 
James G Kellas, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow. 
August 1991 
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